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Abstract
In this review, we argue that the pattern of trafficking needs to be understood 
through the impact of legislative forces and human rights policies in place in the 
host countries of trafficking. Analyzing trafficking patterns solely through the 
lens of economic, labor market and demographic variables leaves a key question 
unanswered: how much of the incidence of trafficking into host countries is due 
to perverse incentives created for traffickers by the provision and enforcement 
of policies that grant human rights (such as amnesty) to trafficked victims? The 
reason why we focus on this particular policy is twofold. First, the role of amnesty 
in creating possible perverse incentives for traffickers is controversial and has 
not been explored in the literature. While economic and enforcement factors 
affecting the “market” for trafficked victims for commercial sexual exploitation 
through incentives for traffickers have received a fair amount of attention, the 
impact of legislation surrounding anti-trafficking activities in host countries on 
the incentives for traffickers remain an equally important but unexplored issue. 
Second, from a normative point of view, the role of amnesty for trafficked victims 
needs careful evaluation. We argue that while the policy of amnesty does protect 
the rights of trafficked victims in host countries, it cannot be viewed as a policy 
that deters traffickers, but as one that may in fact increase the incentive to select 
countries that offer amnesty as destination countries for victims.
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Introduction
The term “trafficking” refers to a set of interrelated activities that encompass 
migration, prostitution, and acts that violate human rights. The term is synonymous 
with illicit trade in human beings across international borders or within the same 
country. A subset of such activities is the trafficking of women and children for 
purposes of forced commercial sexual exploitation – an activity synonymous with 
slavery and designated by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as one 
of the “Worst Forms of Child Labor.” Trafficking of children is often discussed 
together with the trafficking of women, the main reasons being that: (i) available 
data on trafficking of women are not disaggregated by age; and, (ii) there is 
considerable debate regarding the age at which a child should be considered an 
adult. For example, the majority of women coerced into prostitution are between 
16 and 24 years of age.1 However, 16 and 17-year old girls are children according 
to the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the ILO Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention (182). The issue of age is further complicated 
by considerable variations in national laws regarding the age until which an 
individual is considered a “child.” Ireland protects those under 17 as children, 
while Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom accord protection to those under 16. The age for protection is 
15 in France, Sweden, and Denmark, while it is 14 in Austria and Germany. 2 The 
age of consent for sexual matters is 15 in Denmark: thus, the word “child” in the 
Danish provision on child pornography is only applicable to individuals below the 
age of 15.  
The above variation regarding the legal definition of a child notwithstanding, 
there is broad consensus regarding activities that fall under the definition of 
trafficking in women and children. Specifically in the context of child trafficking, 
according to the ILO, trafficking is said to occur if: (i) a child is misled with 
false reports or promises, coerced, or otherwise forcibly recruited/handed over 
to transporters; (ii) a child is lied to about the destination; and (iii) a child is 
lied to about either the nature of work (i.e., recruited as a dancer but forced into 
prostitution) or the wages and methods of payment. Trafficking may also take the 
form of physical or mental abuse, confinement, inadequate or nonexistent health 
care, poor accommodation, and hazardous work.3 A comprehensive definition 
of trafficking, the most recent and frequently cited by researchers, is the U.N. 
1 June Kane & Panudda BoonPala, InternatIonal Programme on the elImInatIon of ChIld laBour, 
unBearaBle to the human heart: ChIld traffICKIng and aCtIon to elImInate It (International Labour 
Organization, Geneva, 2002) [hereinafter ILO 2002].
2 Michael J. Dennis , Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 94 American 
Journal of International Law 789, at 794 (2000) [hereinafter Dennis 2000] [citing VItIt muntarBhorn, 
extraterrItorIal CrImInal laws agaInst ChIld sexual exPloItatIon at 23 (unICef 1998)].
3 ILO 2002, supra note 1.
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Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children of 2000. The Palermo Protocol encompasses three 
primary features associated with trafficking: (i) activities that constitute human 
trafficking (recruitment, transportation, harboring, receipt of persons), (ii) means 
being used (force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability), and (iii) purpose, which is exploitation (prostitution of 
others, sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery). 
The Palermo Protocol is one of the more recent attempts to define the term 
“trafficking” and outline the activities that surround it, although the act of 
trafficking has been couched within earlier definitions of “forced labor” dating 
back to Convention No. 29 of the ILO in 1930. ILO Convention No. 29 defines 
forced or compulsory labor as “all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily.”4 Subsequently, ILO Convention No. 105, adopted 
in 1957, specifies that forced labor cannot be used for the purpose of economic 
development or as a means of political education, discrimination, labor discipline 
or punishment for having participated in strikes.5 One of the forms of forced labor 
under the ILO definition is ‘forced commercial and sexual exploitation,’ which 
includes women, men and children who have been forced by private agents into 
prostitution or into other forms of commercial sexual activities.6 
Estimates for the period of 1995-2004 put the number of cases of forced 
labor and the number of trafficked victims worldwide at 12.3 million.7 Of these, 
2.5 million are forced to work by the State (forced labor camps, child soldiers), 
1.4 million in commercial sexual exploitation, and 7.8 million in other forms 
of economic exploitation.8 In addition, more than 500,000 victims could not be 
assigned to either of the forced labor categories above. Specifically, in the context 
of forced commercial sexual exploitation, Belser provides a regional breakdown 
4 International Labour Organization (ILO), 14th Sess., Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour, 
opened for signature June 28, 1930 (entered into force May 1, 1932) at Article 2(1). Convention No. 29 
allows exemptions for military service and prisoners convicted in a court of law and working under the 
control of a public authority, at Article 2(1) (a) and (c). 
5 ILO, 40th Sess., Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, opened for signature 
June 25, 1957 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959) at Article 1. See also, Patrick Belser, Forced Labour 
and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits, at 2 (ILO, DECLARATION/WP/42/2005, March 2005), 
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=forcedlabor 
[hereinafter Belser 2005].
6 See, InternatIonal laBour organIzatIon, a gloBal allIanCe agaInst forCed laBour, (ILO Report, 
2005). The other two forms of forced labor as defined by the ILO are: (i) forced labor imposed by the 
State or by armed forces/rebels which includes compulsory participation in public works and forced prison 
labor and (ii) forced labor for economic exploitation, other than in the sex industry, by private agents and 
enterprises. 
7 Belser 2005, supra note 5 at 4. The ILO estimates are calculated from reports by International Organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, police and other sources.
8 Id.
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of the number of victims: 200,000 in industrialized economies, 98,000 in transition 
economies, 902,000 in the Asia and the Pacific, 115,000 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 50,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 25,000 in the Middle-East and North 
Africa.9 
Moreover, a large share of the victims in forced commercial sexual exploitation 
particularly in the industrialized economies, and in Asia and the Pacific, are also 
victims of international and internal trafficking. For instance, 63% of victims 
in forced commercial sexual exploitation in the industrialized economies are 
trafficking related while the corresponding percentage for Asia and the Pacific 
stands at 54%, transition economies at 45%, Latin America and the Caribbean 
at 12%, Sub-Saharan Africa at 6% and the Middle East and North Africa at 10%. 
Perhaps more striking are the profits from forced commercial sexual exploitation 
as a result of trafficking. Belser finds that global profits made from trafficking into 
forced commercial sexual exploitation over the period 1995-2004 amount to $27.8 
billion; $13.3 billion of which is in the industrialized economies, $9.5 billion in 
Asia, $3.2 billion in the transition economies, $1.0 billion in Middle East and North 
Africa, $0.6 billion in Latin America and $0.1 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa.10
The profitability from commercial sexual exploitation engendered through 
trafficking begs two important questions. First, what are the push (supply side) 
and pull (demand side) factors that allow for the persistence of the trade of human 
beings across national borders? Apart from the customary socio-economic and 
political variables that impact the market for transnational trafficked victims such 
as poverty, lack of educational opportunities, lure of higher wages in developed 
countries, a key question remains unanswered: what explains the persistence 
of only some of the poorer countries as primary source countries from where 
trafficked victims hail, and what explains the persistence of only some of the 
richer countries as destinations for these victims? Second, it is worth emphasizing 
that a distinguishing feature of international trafficking is that a middleman is 
involved. Such a middleman may be an individual “recruiter” with an aim to serve 
the receiving end at the lowest cost, a smuggler of illegal migrants specializing 
in evading border controls, or a criminal network operating on both the supply 
and the final demand sides.11 Thus, in addition to the aforementioned push and 
pull factors, it is important to understand how these different types of traffickers 
operate, and more importantly, how legislation granting human rights to trafficked 
individuals in the host and source countries of trafficking affects the incentives of 
9 Belser 2005, supra note 5 at 5.
10 All amounts are cited in United States Dollars (USD).
11 See generally, u.s. dePartment of state, traffICKIng In Persons rePort 2003, (offICe of the 
underseCretary for gloBal affaIrs, unIted states dePartment of state PuBlICatIon no. 11057) 
[hereinafter tIP rePort 2003].
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traffickers that leads to a persistence of trafficking in women and children across 
international borders. 
Accordingly, Part I of this article will review evidence collected by Basu and 
Chau in countries distinguished as host, source and transit countries of trafficking 
victims, and which underscores the economic and demographic variables that 
explain the location of countries in these three categories.12 Part II will take a closer 
look at the legislative variables surrounding trafficking activities in these three types 
of countries. Particular attention is paid to the role of amnesty13 in host countries 
in creating possible perverse incentives for traffickers. This is a controversial issue 
and while economic and enforcement factors affecting the “market” for trafficked 
victims for commercial sexual exploitation through incentives for traffickers have 
received a fair amount of attention, the role of legislation in host countries is an 
equally important but relatively unexplored one. From a normative point of view, 
the role of amnesty for trafficked victims needs careful evaluation—something 
that is explored in Part III. While the policy of amnesty does protect the rights 
of trafficked victims in host countries, it cannot be viewed as a policy that deters 
traffickers, and may in fact increase their incentive to select countries that offer 
amnesty as destination countries for victims.
I. Data and Patterns of Trafficking
Actual data on the incidence of international trafficking is sparse. The primary 
reason for this is that victims and survivors of trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
as well as traffickers and illegal migrants are part of a “hidden population” in any 
country.14 In addition, lax enforcement, corruption and denial or under-reporting 
of the extent of the problem by officials and governments world-wide, makes 
it impossible to establish a representative sample for analytical purposes. As a 
consequence, qualitative research on the topic is based primarily on piece-meal 
information such as “70% and 80% of trafficked women into the Netherlands and 
Germany are from Central and Eastern European countries”15 or the “majority of 
trafficked women into Thailand [are] from Myanmar and Cambodia.”16 Only two 
countries/official bureaus – the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation 
12 Arnab K. Basu & Nancy H. Chau, An Exploration of the Worst Forms of Child Labor: Is Redemption a 
Viable Option? in BuyIng freedom: the ethICs and eConomICs of slaVe redemPtIon, (K. Anthony Appiah 
& Martin Brunzl ed. Princeton University Press, 2007) at 37-76 [hereinafter Basu & Chau 2007].
13 Generally speaking, amnesty is the concept whereby offense are pardoned.
14 See generally, Guri Tyldum & Anette Brunovskis, Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges 
in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking, 43 International Migration Journal, 17 (2005).
15 See, John Salt, Trafficking and Human Smuggling: A European Perspective, 43 International Migration 
Journal, 32 (2005) [hereinafter Salt 2005] and Donna Hughes, The ‘Natasha’ Trade: The Transnational 
Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women’ 53 (2) Journal of International Affairs 625 (2005).
16 ILO 2002, supra note 1.
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(Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) and the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in 
Human Beings in the Netherlands have national databases on trafficked women 
forced into prostitution in these countries. 
Among international organizations and academic institutions, it is the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) that has collected data since 1999 
from persons assisted under IOM’s counter-trafficking programs. The data in the 
Counter-Trafficking Module Database (CTM) of the IOM comes primarily from 
the Balkans, a region that also has the Regional Clearing Point (RCP) database 
maintained by the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings 
since 2002.17 Recently, a unique dataset was collected by the ILO’s Special Action 
Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL). Based on questionnaires from 
160 returned migrants in four origin countries (Albania, Romania, Moldova and 
Ukraine), interviews with informants, focus group discussions and research in 
seven destination countries (France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, Turkey 
and United Kingdom), the SAP-FL database contains 298 entries of forced labor 
of which 186 are trafficked victims. Two findings from the SAP-FL database 
warrant mention: (i) 43% of trafficked victims found jobs through an intermediary 
while 11.9% found a job via agencies and (ii) 32.4% of the trafficked victims 
were engaged in sex work while 12.8% were engaged in entertainment/dancing/
bartending.18 In addition, a recent study by Mahmoud and Trebesch analyzes 
IOM data from 5,513 households in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and 
Ukraine and shows that members of migrant families in migration areas and with 
larger migrant networks are much more likely to become victims of trafficking.19 
Further, illegal migration increases the risk of being trafficked, while information 
campaigns have a negative impact on the likelihood of being trafficked.
Nevertheless, by relying primarily on samples generated either through 
household surveys in source countries or through interviews with survivors 
identified by law enforcement agencies and NGOs, two potential problems arise: 
(i) it is impossible to ascertain the total number of trafficked victims from survivor 
samples, and hence the total number of trafficked victims in a year or even over a 
time period is unknown; and (ii) studies based on survivor interviews lead to an 
unbalanced emphasis on the supply-side of the problem of trafficking and limit 
analysis of the demand-side factors (economic and legislative) that create a market 
for trafficked individuals in the destination countries. As a result, the operational 
17 Frank Laczko, Data and Research on Human Trafficking, 43 International Migration Journal 5 (2005). 
18 Beate Andrees & Mariska N. J. van der Linden, Designing Trafficking Research, 43 International Migration 
Journal 55 (2005).
19 See generally, Toman Omar Mahmoud & Cristophe Trebesch, The Economic Drivers of Human Trafficking: 
Micro-Evidence from Five Eastern European Countries, (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Working 
Paper No. 1480, Feb. 2009) available at http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/the-economic-
drivers-of-human-trafficking-micro-evidence-from-five-eastern-european-countries/kap1480.pdf.
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network of traffickers, the specific features of the sectors in which trafficked 
victims are forced to work, the economic and demographic characteristics of host 
and source countries of trafficking and finally, international and national legislation 
in host and source countries that affect the incentives of traffickers have yet to be 
thoroughly analyzed.20
In terms of a global picture of the incidence of trafficking, there are three 
noteworthy sources. A global database for trafficking trends is available from the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which contains data on 
victims, traffickers and trafficking routes collected mostly from the industrialized 
countries. Second, the U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
country reports provide a qualitative sample of host and source countries of 
trafficking based on reports published in the host countries, and only for those 
host countries where at least 100 cases of trafficking were discovered in the past 
year.21 Third, The Protection Project at The Johns Hopkins University School 
of Advanced International Studies details trafficking routes as well as laws and 
legislation surrounding trafficking and prostitution in every country.22 
In order to unravel the pattern of trafficking in women and children between 
countries, we first present data from Basu and Chau23 which looked at the country-
by-country reports in the U.S. Department of State TIP Report 200324 and The 
Protection Project Report 2002.25 Of primary interest is the classification of 
countries into four mutually exclusive groups: host countries, source countries, 
trafficking hubs (both a host and a source country), and countries with no reported 
incidence of trafficking. Of the 187 countries in our dataset, 32 countries are 
20 An exception to this statement, where econometric analysis of legislations in source and host countries of 
trafficking show that the likelihood of a host-source country match increases with the provision of amnesty 
in a host country and a ban on prostitution in a source country, can be found in Randall Akee, Arnab Basu, 
Arjun Bedi & Nancy Chau, Determinants of Trafficking in Women and Children: Theory, Empirics and 
Policy Implications, Third IZA/World Bank Conference on Employment and Development, Participant 
Paper, 2008, http://www.iza.org/conference_files/worldb2008/basu_a3581.pdf.
21 Copies of the annual U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Reports can be found at http://www.
state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
22 See the ProteCtIon ProJeCt human rIghts rePort on traffICKIng In Persons, esPeCIally women and 
ChIldren: a Country-By-Country rePort on a ContemPorary form of slaVery (the ProteCtIon ProJeCt 
at the Johns hoPKIns unIVersIty sChool of adVanCed InternatIonal studIes, washIngton dC, 2nd ed. 2002) 
[hereInafter tPP traffICKIng rePort 2002]. the ProteCtIon ProJeCt uPdated Its traffICKIng rePort In 
2005 and Is due to PuBlIsh agaIn In 2009.
23 Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12.
24 TIP Report 2003, supra note 11.
25 TPP Trafficking Report 2002, supra note 22. As stated in the Introduction, the problems associated with 
segregating data on women from that on children due to the various national interpretations of legal age 
entails analysis of the joint incidence of trafficking in women and children only.
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identified as source,26 45 as hosts,27 66 as hubs (or transit countries that act as both 
source and host),28 44 countries with no reported incidence.29
The pattern of trafficking and the types of work that trafficked individuals are 
engaged in vary across countries and continents. For instance, in Africa, the most 
common source countries of trafficking are Sierra Leone, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Somalia, from which children and women are trafficked to South 
Africa, Gabon, Gambia, and Western European countries primarily to work in the 
sex industry. There is also a steady supply of trafficked children from Mali to Côte 
d’Ivoire who end up working in cocoa plantations.30 In Asia, the most common 
source countries of trafficking seem to be Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam, Bhutan, 
Laos, and Cambodia, while the host countries are India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Australia. Trafficked children and 
women are engaged in a variety of work. The primary activity remains prostitution, 
but an increasing number also work as domestic helpers in host countries, while 
young boys are smuggled from Bangladesh and India to work as camel jockeys in 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.31 
26 Source countries are determined to include: Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Cape Verde, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Latvia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, 
Slovenia, Somalia, Tajikistan and Zambia (Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12).
27 Host countries are determined to include: Antigua, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (SAR), Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Macau (SAR), Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Yemen and Yugoslavia (Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12).
28 Hub countries are determined to include: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Taiwan, Tanzania, 
TFYR Macedonia, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam and 
Zimbabwe (Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12).
29 Countries with no reported incidence of trafficking are: Andorra, Bahamas, Barbados, Burundi, Comoros, 
Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, Iceland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, 
Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Oman, Palau, Palestine, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, 
San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uruguay and Vanatu (Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12).
30 See unICef, traffICKIng In human BeIngs esPeCIally women and ChIldren In afrICa, (InnoCentI 
researCh Center, unICef, florenCe, 2005) available at httP://www.unICef-IrC.org/PuBlICatIons/Pdf/
traffICKIng-gB2ed-2005.Pdf. See alSo, aderantI adePoJu, Review of ReSeaRch on human tRafficking in Sub-
SahaRan afRica 43 InternatIonal mIgratIon Journal 75 (2005).
31 ILO 2002, supra note 1.
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, the root of trafficking lies in poverty, 
political instability and gender attitudes leading to social and income inequalities. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of anti-trafficking legislation and enforcement 
of existing laws against pimps and facilitators is non-existent.32 The source 
countries of trafficking are Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, while destination countries are Argentina, 
Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica and Panama. El Salvador is a hub – a source, transit 
and destination country for trafficked victims. Typically, source countries in this 
region are characterized by low GDP per-capita, relatively higher youth illiteracy 
and lower female primary school enrollment.33 Similarly, trafficked women and 
children from the former republics of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) are usually forced into prostitution in 
Western European countries (especially Germany, Italy, and Greece). 
The determinants of trafficking can be broken up into push (supply-side) 
and pull (demand-side) factors. Some of the supply-side factors that give rise to 
trafficking and prostitution are the same that lead to the emergence and persistence 
of child labor, that is, poverty and lack of educational opportunities. In addition, 
armed conflict in some African countries such as Sierra Leone and Sudan gives rise 
to social fragmentation that makes it easier for children to be forcibly removed and 
trafficked by various factions. On the demand side, the largest demand for child 
trafficking and prostitution may be linked to the growth in income in both developed 
and developing countries. For developed countries, two factors are frequently 
alleged to be in play: (i) the rise of tourism from developed to developing countries 
and the subsequent rise in the demand for “sex tourism” as developed countries 
increasingly strengthen laws to protect minors and increase enforcement related 
to prostitution; and (ii) economic growth in developed countries, low fertility, and 
the subsequent increase in demand for cheap migrant labor. The latter effect is 
also evident in some developing countries that have witnessed relative prosperity 
over the last decade, and where the native population has gradually moved away 
from low-skilled, low-wage employment sectors. Consequently, legal and illegal 
migrants are now filling employment in these low-wage sectors. As an example, 
an increased number of children have migrated and/or have been trafficked 
into Thailand from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia to work in exploitative jobs 
previously done by Thai children.34
32 See Laura Langberg, A Review of Recent OAS Research on Human Trafficking in the Latin American and 
Caribbean Region 43 International Migration Journal 129 (2005) [hereinafter Langberg 2005].
33 Id.
34 ILO 2002, supra note 1.
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Indeed, evidence suggests that there are links between sending and receiving 
countries of trafficked victims. These links are influenced by a number of factors: 
(i) traffickers’ use of local knowledge about key locations or weaknesses in border 
and migration control; (ii) presence and tolerance of an extensive sex industry 
in receiving countries; (iii) historical/colonial links between countries and the 
existence of a large immigrant population in the receiving country.35 Recent 
empirical work by Basu and Chau36 underscores the differences in labor force 
composition and demographic characteristics of source, hub (transit), and host 
countries of trafficking victims. For instance, a typical worker in a source country 
for international trafficking or a trafficking hub is more likely to be employed 
in agriculture as compared to a worker in a host country. Source countries also 
exhibit a higher dependency ratio (ratio of children ages 0-14 to total population 
of a country). There is likewise a correspondingly higher incidence of child labor 
in source countries and trafficking hubs, with shares of economically active 
children (ages 10-14) at 13.7% in source countries and 12.9% in trafficking hubs, 
as compared to around 3.8% in host countries. Employment of adults, in contrast, 
exhibits the opposite pattern, with adult unemployment rates for both female and 
male nearly twice as high in source countries and trafficking hubs, as compared to 
host countries of trafficking. Meanwhile, dependence on income through workers’ 
remittance from employment or other income sources abroad as a percentage of 
gross national product is higher in source countries and trafficking hubs (2.6%) as 
compared to host countries of trafficking (1.6%).
The empirical patterns described above are similar to the factors highlighted by 
Bales, who used multiple regression analysis to examine patterns of trafficking.37 
Bales found that for source countries the rank order of the factors (in terms of the 
importance of their effect) that affect the supply side of trafficking was higher 
government corruption, higher infant mortality rate (indication of population 
pressure), higher proportion of the population below age 14, lower food production 
index (an indication of poverty), higher population density and higher prevalence 
of conflict/social unrest. For host countries the rank order was less conclusive – 
more permeable borders (proxied by corruption), higher population over the age of 
60, higher food production, higher energy consumption and lower infant mortality 
(the last three are indicators of the economic well-being of a host country). In 
addition, Ruggiero identifies sectors within host countries that most profit from 
trafficking to be the service sectors (restaurants, factories and farms), legitimate 
35 See generally, Liz Kelly & Linda Regan, Stopping Traffic: Exploring the Extent of, and Responses to, 
Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation in the UK, (UK Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime 
Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London 2000) available at http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs125.pdf.
36 Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12.
37 Kevin Bales “What Predicts Global Trafficking?” paper presented at the International Conference on New 
Frontiers of Crime: Trafficking in Human Beings and New Forms of Slavery, Verona, 22-23 October 1999.
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domestic service industries (households that employ maids), building, construction 
and textile industries, and the illegal sex industry.38
An interesting result pertains to how global links for source countries impact the 
push and pull factors of the trafficking market. Basu and Chau find that the average 
host country’s dependence on trade (measured by the trade share of GDP) is in 
fact quite similar to that of the average source country’s dependence on trade.39 Of 
particular interest is the notion that trafficking of women and children is correlated 
with tourism. However, Basu and Chau observe no statistically significant difference 
between international tourism expenditure, either as a fraction of total exports or 
gross national product, between source and host countries of trafficking.40 More 
precisely, the notion that countries such as Thailand which rely heavily on tourist 
revenues (and which might include revenues from alleged sex tourism) are also 
host countries of trafficked women and children for prostitution related activities 
is rejected by empirical tests. Indeed, international tourism receipts (whether as a 
fraction of export revenues or of gross national product) are on average smaller in 
countries that host trafficked victims in our sample.
II. Conventions, Legislation and Enforcement
The pattern of trafficking explored in the last section puts international trafficking 
squarely in the context of the economic push and pull factors enumerated above. 
However, focusing on economic factors alone does not allow one to distinguish 
the legislative forces at play in the host and source countries that govern the 
incentives of traffickers. We start with an overview of some of the related existing 
international and national legislation to combat trafficking and forced labor 
and then look at the distribution of host and source countries in terms of their 
ratification of international laws, specific legislation surrounding prostitution and 
related activities in these countries and finally, law enforcement variables in host 
and source countries of trafficking. 
In addition to ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105 and the U.N. Palermo 
Protocol, a number of countries have ratified and adopted a range of international 
laws, particularly ILO Convention 138 concerning the Minimum Age for Admission 
to Employment (1973),41 and the ILO Convention 182 on the Elimination of the 
38 V. Ruggiero, Criminals and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies, 28 Crime, Law and Social 
Change 27 (1997).
39 Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12.
40 Id.
41 ILO, 58th Sess., Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, opened 
for signature June 26, 1973 (entered into force June 19, 1976).
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Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999).42 In addition to these ILO conventions, the 
United Nations specifically targets trafficking through its International Agreement 
for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904)43 and the United Nations 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1956) and upholds 
children’s rights through the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).44 
While laws regarding minimum age and the rights of the child do not directly fall 
under the purview of anti-trafficking laws, anti-child labor legislation (or the lack 
thereof) can be expected to have a significant impact on child trafficking since two 
key demographic variables—a high dependency ratio and a high incidence of child 
labor—are synonymous with the source countries of trafficking. However, unlike 
minimum age legislation, the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
(No. 182) calls for the immediate suppression of extreme forms of child labor 
including: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, sale, trafficking of 
children, forced or compulsory labor including debt bondage and serfdom; (b) the 
use, engagement or offering of a child for the purposes of prostitution, production 
of pornography or pornographic performances, production of or trafficking in 
drugs or other illegal activities; and (c) the use or engagement of children in any 
type of work, which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to jeopardize their health, safety, or morals.45 
While legislation surrounding child labor might play an important role for source 
countries of trafficking, national legislation, particularly laws that grant amnesty 
to trafficked victims in host countries of trafficking, may play an important role in 
tilting the incentive of traffickers to target these countries as potential destinations. 
In order to understand the role amnesty plays in the selection of a country as a 
destination, we take a look first at the prevailing anti-trafficking laws in the United 
States and the European Union. The most significant national legislation on anti-
trafficking in the U.S., the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA),46 
defines severe forms of trafficking in persons as:
 
42 ILO, 87th Sess., Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, opened for signature June 17, 1999 (entered into force Nov. 19, 2000) 
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182].
43 International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” Paris, May 18, 1904, League of 
Nations. See also, Dennis 2000 supra note 2 for a comprehensive treatment of U.N. and other international 
legislation regarding child labor.
44 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25, opened for signature Nov. 
20, 1989 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
45 ILO Convention No. 182 supra note 42, at article 3. See also, Janelle Diller & David M. Levy, Child Labor, 
Trade and Investment: Toward a Harmonization of International Law, 91 American Journal of International 
Law 663 for an excellent survey of international conventions and laws governing child labor.
46 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) [hereinafter TVPA 2000].
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(a) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, 
fraud, and coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act 
has not attained 18 years of age; or 
(b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining 
of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, 
debt bondage, or slavery.47 
Further, in the U.S., while persons smuggled into the country are usually 
deported, trafficked victims are accorded protection.48 During the period 2000-
2003 over 400 adult victims received certification for benefits eligibility49 including 
medical care, food stamps, housing and cash assistance, and immigration relief.50 
A number of initiatives have also been undertaken by European Union countries 
to combat trafficking in humans. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings of 200551 is the most recent initiative at the 
regional level. Article 14 of the Convention allows for a residence permit for 
trafficked victims and states that,
Each Party shall issue a renewable residence permit to victims, in 
one or other of the two following situations or in both: (a) the competent 
authority considers that their stay is necessary owing to their personal 
situation; (b) the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary 
for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in 
investigation or criminal proceedings. 
The first countries to ratify the Convention were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. It has since 
been ratified by a further 14 countries as of May 2009.52 The Convention has also 
47 Id. §103 (8). The TVPA has been reauthorized three times, in 2003, 2005 and 2008.
48 Langberg 2005, supra note 32.
49 See, Elzbieta M. Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in North America: 
A Review of the Literature, 43 (1-2) International Migration Journal 99 (2005) [hereinafter Gozdziak & 
Collett 2005]. Child victims do not require certification to receive benefits, TVPA 2000 §107.
50 Id. Furthermore, the United States Department of State in 2004 reviewed efforts made by 140 governments 
to combat trafficking with increased funding for anti-trafficking programs. In addition, 2003 data suggests 
that the United States supported 190 anti-trafficking programs in 92 countries with US $72 million, an 
increase from 118 programs in 55 countries in 2001.
51 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CoE Treaty Series - No. 
197, (2005).
52 Countries that ratified in 2008 and 2009 include: Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and the United Kingdom 
[As of May 15, 2009].
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been signed, but not yet ratified by 17 other member States53 and six member States 
have not yet signed the Convention.54 
The Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005 aside, 
individual countries within the EU have their own anti-trafficking and smuggling 
laws. One particular law entails the granting of amnesty to trafficking victims such 
as in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Variations in the coding of the law aside, 
the salient features of amnesty involve: (i) trafficked persons are given access to 
necessary medical assistance; (ii) a minimum recovery and reflection period of at 
least three months is offered to all trafficked persons, and the person’s presence 
in the country is regularized and recognized during this time; (iii) minimum six 
months-renewable and permanent residence permits are issued to trafficked persons 
on the basis of the needs and risks of their personal situation and/or to ensure their 
presence during proceedings (against the traffickers and/or for compensation), 
and family reunification is available; and (iv) trafficked persons are not detained, 
charged, or prosecuted for illegal entry or residence and activities which are a 
direct consequence of their situation as trafficked persons.55
Turning to the adoption of legislation related to trafficking, Basu and Chau56 
looked at the distribution of anti-trafficking conventions and legislation across 
source, host and hub countries of trafficking. Amongst international conventions, 
Table 1 reports the pattern of ratification of the ILO conventions on the Abolition 
of Forced Labour 105 and the Worst Forms of Child Labour 182, along with three 
other United Nations Protocols: (i) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (OPSC) which calls for an end to the sale of children for the 
purposes of prostitution and pornography, (ii) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons (PPSPT), and (iii) the Migrant Workers’ Convention 
(MWC) that calls for the protection of the rights of migrant workers and members 
of their families. The patterns of the ratification of these conventions differ widely 
(Table 1).57 These patterns range from almost universal commitment to abolish 
forced labor, to the relative popularity amongst host countries of trafficking to the 
53 Countries that have signed but not ratified include: Andorra, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and the Ukraine [As of May 15, 2009].
54 Member states that have not yet signed include: Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, and the Russian Federation [As of May 15, 2009].
55 As a concrete example, Italy’s Law 228/2003 – “Measures against Trafficking in Persons” drafted by the 
Ministry of Equal Opportunities grants residency status for the victims of trafficking by granting a special 
visa to victims of exploitation for reasons of prostitution and other crimes related to prostitution. See 
Marina Elefante, Slave Women: The Italian Legal Response to the International Trafficking in Women, 1 
The Protection Project Journal of Human Rights and Civil Society 1 (2007) at 1.
56 Basu & Chau 2007, supra note 12.
57 These legislative and law enforcement variables are taken from TPP Trafficking Report 2002, supra note 
22; the latest available years of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 
International Crime Victim Survey, (2004) available at http://www.unicri.it/icvs/; and the United Nations 
The Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Office 2004).
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commitment to eliminate the worst forms of child labor (which includes the sale 
of children and international trafficking). By contrast, ratification of the Migrant 
Workers’ Convention is more prevalent among source countries of international 
trafficking.
In terms of national statutes with specific reference to trafficking and 
prostitution, a high percentage of host countries have enacted laws to protect 
the rights of trafficking victims. Around 22% of host countries grant legal status 
to trafficking victims, whereas no source countries do so. With respect to legal 
restrictions on prostitution and other related activities, laws banning prostitution 
are most common amongst trafficking hubs, followed by host and source countries. 
Meanwhile, laws banning activities surrounding and promoting prostitution, such 
as pimping, pandering, and brothels, are more common in host countries. With the 
exception of the Migrant Workers’ Convention, which covers voluntary migrants 
as well, these observations would seem to indicate that a larger average share of 
host countries enact legislation answering to the international call to end trafficking 
and to protect trafficking victims.58 
Table 1: International and National Legislation
Ratification of International Conventions Host Hub Source All
ILO Convention 105 88.1% 82.5% 89.7% 84.3%
ILO Convention 182 61.9% 54.0% 37.9% 53.0%
PPSPT 47.6% 50.8% 37.9% 47.0%
OPSC 50.0% 33.3% 34.5% 39.8%
MWC 4.8% 14.3% 20.7% 13.3%
National Legislations Host Hub Source All
Grant Legal Status to Trafficked Victims 22.2% 6.2% 0.0% 7.6%
Prohibit Prostitution 35.6% 41.5% 34.4% 38.3%
Prohibit Pimping 86.7% 75.4% 75.0% 79.2%
Prohibit Brothels 55.6% 41.5% 50.0% 47.0%
Source: Basu & Chau (2007)59
58 It is important to note that why and when countries adopt international conventions is an area of inquiry 
that is still in its infancy. Chau & Kanbur, show, with specific reference to the four core labor standards of 
the ILO, that the ratification pattern is highly convention-specific. What is important in our context is that 
whereas countries with higher income per capita (the host countries) appear to be more likely to participate 
in international conventions and domestic legislation protective of victims’ rights, the same is not true for 
many other core labor standard conventions. In fact, the stage of development of an economy is not always 
a good predictor of ratification. See, Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Adoption of International Labor 
Standards: Who, When and Why, Brookings Trade Forum 2001, (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 
2002) available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookings_trade_forum/v2001/2001.1chau.pdf.
59 Supra note 12.
19The Protection Project Journal of Human Rights and Civil Society
In addition to the enactment of national laws and the ratification of international 
conventions, one might argue that of even more importance is the extent to which 
these laws are enforced. To this end, Table 2 summarizes data taken from the U.N. 
Survey of Crime Trends (Seventh Survey) for the year 2000.60 The capacity of police 
enforcement is expressed in two ways. The variable police denote the number of 
police personnel per 100 thousand persons. The variable convicted persons per 
crime provide the number of convicted persons per reported crime in a country. 
The police variable captures the physical capacity of the police force, while the 
convicted persons per crime variable is concerned with the efficiency of the police 
force. These two variables give two very different pictures of the capability of 
policy enforcement. In particular, host countries have, on average, a higher police 
force per capita than do source countries and trafficking hubs. Nevertheless, the 
number of convicted persons per recorded crime is also the lowest in host countries. 
These conflicting observations may have to do with the under-reporting of 
crimes by victims in source countries. There are at least three reasons why under-
reporting in source countries is of interest in the context of trafficking. First, for 
traffickers operating in potential source countries, under-reporting is of course 
advantageous, since the likelihood of getting caught is accordingly lower. Second, 
under-reporting may also be a signal of the public’s distrust of the police force, due 
for instance to corruption among public officials. Third, the lower conviction rate 
in host countries could be due to the fact that in host (developed) countries, the 
burden of proof required to convict someone may be much higher than in source 
(poorer) countries. All of these factors concern the degree of access to effective law 
enforcement, and separate the (economic) push and pull factors of international 
migration, as distinct from the criminal activities associated with international 
trafficking. As a partial remedy to this issue of access, the “rule of law” governance 
indicator from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton is also used.61 The “rule of 
law” indicator is a composite index of (i) voice (e.g., freedom of press and the 
freedom to associate) and accountability; (ii) political stability/lack of violence; 
(iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory framework; (v) rule of law; and (vi) 
control of corruption. The index ranges from -3 (worst) to +3 (best). As Table 2 
shows, source and hub countries of trafficking on average have a lower rule of law 
indicator as compared to host countries. 
60 Supra note 57.
61 See, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Aggregating Governance Indicators (World 
Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper no. 2195, 1999); and, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & 
Pablo Zoido-Lobaton Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper no. 
2196, 1999).
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Table 2: Crime and Law Enforcement
Host Hub Source All
Police Personnel (per 100K) 289.65 288.78 272.04 286.38
Total Recorded Crimes (per 100K) 4918.92 1825.94 1387.27 2991.97
Total Convicted Persons (per 100K) 809.62 735.15 337.01 692.38
Convicted Persons per Recorded Crime 0.17 0.30 0.41 0.27
Rule of Law 0.73 -0.30 -0.52 0.01
 Source: Basu & Chau (2007)62
III. Intervention in Illegal Markets and Perverse Incentives
Trafficking is a complex operation that involves a number of players in source, 
transit and host countries. Sometimes, an organized network with each unit within 
the network specializing in a particular activity includes investors, recruiters, 
transporters, corrupt public officials or protectors, informers, guides and crew 
members, enforcers, debt-collectors, money launderers, supporting personnel 
and specialists.63 An indirect measure of how potential victims in search of higher 
paying jobs are lured into foreign countries lies in the fact that traffickers and 
victims are often from the same country of origin. For instance, Salt reports that 
statistics from the Netherlands between 1994-1996 show that 23.1% of those 
apprehended for trafficking came from Eastern European countries with one-third 
from Poland and one-half from the former Soviet Union.64
These percentages also coincide with the percentages of trafficked migrants 
from these countries. Overall, 30-40% of traffickers originated from the 
Netherlands itself. In Germany, the equivalent proportion was 40% while 
in Poland, in 1995, 72% of traffickers were Polish by birth, a number that 
increased to 79% in 1997. In Hungary, before 1995 only 12% of traffickers 
were Hungarian but by 1997-98 this number had increased to over 66%.65 
 Amongst other factors, such a high correlation suggests that recruitment of victims 
and identification of potential host countries are best carried out by recruiters that 
have knowledge about the victims and the legislation in the host countries that 
62 Supra note 12. 
63 See generally, A. Schloenhardt, Organized Crime and the Business of Migrant Trafficking: An Economic 
Analysis, 32 Crime, Law and Social Change 203 (1999).
64 Salt 2005, supra note 15.
65 See, Gerben J. N. Briunsma, & Guus Meershoek, Organized Crime and Trafficking in Women from Eastern 
Europe in the Netherlands, in Illegal ImmIgratIon and CommerCIal sex: the new slaVe trade 105, (Phil 
Williams ed. 1999); and Nathalie Siron & Piet van Baeveghem, Trafficking in Migrants through Poland: 
Multidisciplinary Research into the Phenomenon of Transit Migration in the Candidate Member States of 
the EU, with a View to the Combat of Traffic in Persons, (University of Ghent & European Commission 
STOP, 1999). An interesting observation gleaned from the various studies relates to the average age for 
traffickers. The average age of apprehended traffickers in the Netherlands was 34 while in Poland the sex 
trade was mostly undertaken by men in the 20-25 age group. 
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enables these traffickers to persuade victims to illegally migrate in search of either 
jobs or permanent residency in foreign countries. 
Against this backdrop, the lack of effective legislation to punish traffickers and 
lack of cooperation internally and internationally (coordination and harmonization 
of national policies and laws, bilateral and multilateral agreements on protection of 
victims and punishment for traffickers) are two important reasons why trafficking 
for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation continues to persist.66 Indeed, 
can amnesty to trafficked victims – viewed also as a protection of human rights 
for victims in the host countries of trafficking potentially exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate the problem? Case studies and casual evidence suggest increased 
trafficking into countries that grant amnesty. For instance, in the mid- to late 
1990s, an estimated 175,000 women were trafficked out of Russia and the Eastern 
European countries – 70% of them into Western Europe, especially Germany, 
Italy, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece, Austria and England, while 
3% or 5,000 women were trafficked into the United States and Canada.67 Similarly, 
estimates by the U.S. Department of State after the introduction of the TVPA in 
2000, which grants asylum to trafficking victims, show the number of trafficking 
victims entering the United States in 2004 at 14,000–17,500.68
In a study of asylum policies, trafficking and vulnerability, Koser’s case study 
of Iranian asylum seekers in the Netherlands over the period 1994-1996 identifies 
three issues that point to the nexus between countries with legislation that grant 
asylum and the subsequent rise of illegal immigration.69 First, empirical evidence 
supported the view that increasing proportions of asylum seekers were being forced 
to turn to traffickers in order to negotiate restrictive asylum policies. Second, 
trafficking tends to expose asylum seekers to new forms of vulnerability such as 
harassment by law enforcement officials. Koser notes that although a variety of 
generally restrictive policies in the early 1990s led to a decline in asylum seekers 
in the Netherlands, the numbers had rebounded by 1999. While 30% of asylum 
seekers had hired smugglers in 1996, the number had risen to 60-70% by 2000.70
Third, trafficking has taken the form of a transnational business, which 
actively recruits clients and transports them illegally via transit countries, with 
false documentation, and with asylum seekers frequently exploited by traffickers 
66 Alexis B. Aronowitz, Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that 
Drive it and the Organizations that Promote it, 9 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 163 
(2001) [hereinafter Aronowitz 2001].
67 franCIs t. mIKo & graCe ParK (Jea-hyun), traffICKIng In women and ChIldren: the u.s. and 
InternatIonal resPonse, (Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress 
2002)
68 Gozdziak & Collett 2005, supra note 49.
69 Khalid Koser, Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability, International Migration Journal, Special Issue 
1, 91 (2000).
70 Aronowitz 2001, supra note 66.
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to find themselves in conditions of debt bondage or working involuntarily in the 
sex industry. 
Other than the case studies alluded to above, the exact impact of legislation 
granting amnesty on the incidence of trafficking (empirically or theoretically) is 
still an open question. However, a closer look at the related literature on illicit 
migration offers some clues as to how legislation to control different types of 
migration may have had unintended consequences. First, consider the case of 
smuggling in humans across international borders. According to Aronowitz, there 
are four elements that differentiate smuggling from trafficking: (i) smuggled 
persons always travel voluntarily while trafficked persons can either begin their 
trip voluntarily or may have been coerced or kidnapped; (ii) trafficked persons 
are used and exploited over a long period of time; (iii) an interdependency 
occurs between the trafficked person and the organized crime groups; and, 
(iv) trafficked persons are subsequently recruited for criminal purposes.71 
A further point noted by Kendall, specifically for trafficking victims in the sex 
industry, is that trafficking victims have more interaction with clients.72 This high 
level of interaction increases the likelihood of seeking help, escape or attracting the 
attention of authorities. To prevent this, women are often rotated between criminal 
groups, cities, states and countries. There are, however, some common elements 
that affect smuggled and trafficked persons alike. For instance, both these groups 
might pay a percentage of the cost of transportation to the traffickers upfront 
and incur a debt for the remainder of the trip. Such financial arrangements often 
determine the extent to which these groups become vulnerable to exploitation. 
Financial constraints lead migrants to turn to the traffickers to finance the 
migration costs, and force migrants to enter into temporary servitude contracts to 
repay the debt. Given that these debt contracts are easier to enforce in the illegal 
than in the legal sector of the host country, stricter deportation laws that make it 
costly for migrants to move from the illegal to the legal sector actually lower the 
risks for traffickers, who in turn, are more willing to finance illegal migration. 
Thus, countries with stricter deportation policies may thus paradoxically see an 
increase in illegal/smuggled individuals rather than a decrease.73
71 Id.
72 R. Kendall, “Recent Trends in International Investigations of Trafficking in Human Beings,” paper presented 
at the International Conference on New Frontiers of Crime: Trafficking in Human Beings and New Forms of 
Slavery, Verona, 22-23 October 1999. 
73 See generally, for an analysis of the impact of deportation policies on the incidence of human smuggling, 
Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-financed Migration, 4 Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 1085 (2006).
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Second, policies to control illegal immigration may also entail paradoxical 
policy outcomes especially with regards to the provision of amnesty.74 A key 
counter-intuitive question is why do countries that impose employer sanctions 
to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal 
immigrants? Chau shows that amnesty provision is best understood in the context 
of two widely used immigration policies—border enforcement and employer 
sanction measures.75 Border enforcement is more aptly characterized as an income 
transfer from employers to native labor interests while employer sanctions generate 
deadweight losses that are borne entirely by the employers of illegal immigrants. 
Chau shows that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of 
the immigration reform, as the policy induces higher waves of illegal immigration 
as potential illegal migrants incorporate the possibility of amnesty in their decision 
to migrate, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by “wiping 
the slate clean” and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures.76
Third, consider policies to eliminate one of the “Worst Forms of Child Labor” 
– child labor in debt bondage. A phenomenon widely observed in South Asian 
countries77 in the agricultural sector, debt bondage is an outcome of seasonality 
in agriculture (a lean season where workers have minimal sources of income and 
need to borrow in order to finance their subsistence consumption) and the lack of a 
formal credit market in rural areas. Therefore, the only source of borrowing is from 
rural moneylenders who are also large landlords. In this setting, poor agricultural 
workers borrow in the lean season against the promise to repay with their labor 
services in the peak or harvest season when labor demand is high. Such credit-for-
labor contracts are frequently skewed against poor workers who realize that they 
need to send their children to work in order to repay the full amount of debt. Two 
policies that have received attention and been implemented to eliminate child labor 
in debt bondage deserve mention. The first is legislation banning debt bondage. 
As Basu and Chau show, such a policy simply leads to more child labor per se 
(at the expense of bonded child labor) as poor families still have no alternative 
sources of income to finance subsistence consumption.78 The second, implemented 
in Nepal, is the outright payment of outstanding loans by NGOs and governments 
74 For example, Chau analyzes the time-inconsistency of immigration reform policies. See Nancy H. Chau, 
Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform, 19 Journal of Labor Economics 604 (2001); and 
Nancy H. Chau, Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms, 15 Economics and Politics 
193 (2003).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Namely Pakistan, India and Nepal.
78 See both studies, Arnab K. Basu & Nancy H. Chau, Targeting Child Labor in Debt Bondage: Evidence 
Theory and Policy Prescriptions, 17 The World Bank Economic Review 255 (2003); and, Arnab K. Basu & 
Nancy H. Chau, Exploitation of Child Labor and the Dynamics of Debt Bondage, 9 Journal of Economic 
Growth 209 (2004).
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to the moneylenders, thereby granting freedom to those enslaved in debt bondage. 
Absent any other complementary income generating policy, debt forgiveness leads 
the poor families to fall back into the debt bondage trap the next lean season. 
Each of these examples highlights how policies aimed at providing relief to 
illegal immigrants or exploitative labor can lead to unintended consequences. 
Thus, arguments for strengthening protection and assistance to victims – like 
Italy’s residency permit, need to be complemented by policies that impose harsher 
punishments on traffickers in the host countries and deportation policies between 
source, transit and host countries of trafficking. Second, policies affecting activities 
surrounding forced commercial exploitation of women and children, such as a 
ban/legalization of prostitution, ban on pimping/pandering, need to be coordinated 
between host and source countries. In effect, anti-trafficking legislation in host and 
source countries needs to account for: (i) time-consistency of the policy: much like 
a policy of amnesty to illegal migrants needs to be accompanied by stricter border 
enforcement, amnesty for trafficking victims must go hand-in-hand with increased 
enforcement to prevent traffickers from selecting these countries as potential 
destinations; (ii) identification of the target group: similar to the intervention to 
ameliorate bonded child labor in the absence of policies to combat child labor 
per se, a policy of amnesty to trafficked victims for purposes of commercial 
sexual exploitation needs to be evaluated in terms of its impact on other forms of 
trafficking and human smuggling; (iii) the root causes behind the persistence of 
trafficking (poverty, lack of educational opportunities and information campaigns) 
in the source countries of trafficking need to be addressed alongside legislation that 
ban prostitution and child labor; and, (iv) careful consideration needs to be paid 
to the interplay between immigration and trafficking policies since little is known 
of the extent to which migration and trafficking routes/networks overlap and as a 
consequence, policies that inhibit legal or illegal immigration may well lead to an 
increase in trafficking as an alternative. 
Conclusion
This article has endeavored to show that while the policy of amnesty does 
protect the rights of trafficked victims in host countries, it cannot be viewed as a 
policy that deters traffickers. To this end, countries that introduce amnesty as part 
of a comprehensive and victim-protective law might reconsider such a policy as 
one in need of some fine tuning.
